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SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN: EXTRAORDINARY
CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PERPETUAL STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS IN COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Joseph A. Greene*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1971, Led Zeppelin, one of the most successful rock bands in history, released
the album Led Zeppelin IV, often referred to as the “peak of Seventies hard rock.”1
While it received rave reviews, some within the music community could not help but
notice the similarities between one song on the album and a different one written
previously by another band.2 Four years earlier, in 1967, the band Spirit had released
its first album, which included the instrumental composition “Taurus.”3 A year later,
Spirit was on tour with the then little-known band Led Zeppelin.4 Led Zeppelin
released Led Zeppelin IV years after the tour; members of Spirit noticed that one song
on the album, “Stairway to Heaven,” shared a number of similarities with “Taurus.” 5
However, even after “Stairway to Heaven” became a huge success and a judgment
of music plagiarism could have been lucrative, Randy “California” Wolfe, the band’s
guitarist and composer of “Taurus,” never brought a lawsuit. 6
Wolfe’s reluctance was not on account of music copyright infringement claims
being novel or unprecedented. As early as 1936, researchers began looking into ways
of indexing musical ideas to help composers assess their risk of infringement. 7 For
example, Dr. Siguard Bernhard Hustvedt contemplated creating an index containing
previously used musical expressions. 8 Unfortunately, we will never know if a card
catalog of musical ideas would have been beneficial—or even possible—as it never
came into being. What we do know is that without it, the task of determining whether
one song copied another would fall to someone—and that someone was federal
district courts.
Throughout the twentieth century, federal district courts, especially those
located in the country’s meccas of entertainment—Los Angeles and New York—
experienced an influx of suits from musicians claiming that another artist’s work

* J.D. Candidate, University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2018; B.M. (Music Performance),
2011, University of Southern Maine. The Author extends his thanks to Professor Christine Davik, primary
editor Connor Schratz, and the entire staff and editing team of the Maine Law Review.
1. 500 Greatest Albums of All Time, ROLLING STONE (May 31, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/
music/lists/500-greatest-albums-of-all-time-20120531/led-zeppelin-led-zeppelin-iv-20120524.
2. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV 15–3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 WL 1442461, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 8, 2016).
3. Id. at *1.
4. Id. at *2.
5. Id. at *3.
6. Id.
7. Work Started on Tune Index: Move Begun To End Musical Plagiarism by Savants of Tin Pan
Alley, PITTSBURG PRESS, May 6, 1936, at 36, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1144&dat=1936
0506&id=nFIbAAAAIBAJ&sjid=3EsEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5019,4168497&hl=en.
8. Id.
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bore a “substantial similarity” to their own.9 Large verdicts, settlements, and years
of litigation have turned music copyright infringement claims into big business. In
1976, George Harrison was found to have “subconsciously” copied the Chiffons’s
song “He’s So Fine” when composing his song “My Sweet Lord,” leading to a
settlement in excess of a half-million-dollars and an additional twenty-two years of
litigation.10 In 1990, Vanilla Ice settled out of court with Queen and David Bowie
over the similarity between the bass lines of their respective songs, “Ice Ice Baby”
and “Under Pressure.”11 In 2015, the United States District Court for the Central
District of California ordered Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams to pay $7.4 million
to the estate of Marvin Gaye because a jury found their single “Blurred Lines”
substantially similar to Gaye’s “Got to Give it Up.” 12 And these examples merely
scratch the surface.
A year after the media-jarring “Blurred Lines” verdict, the same district court
heard another high-profile music plagiarism case. Michael Skidmore, the holder of
Randy “California” Wolfe’s copyright in “Taurus,” brought suit in 2014 alleging the
beginning of “Stairway to Heaven” was “substantially similar” to Spirit’s “Taurus.” 13
Unlike any other high profile case, however, this suit was initiated forty-three years
after “Stairway to Heaven” first became a popular success. 14 At first glance, legal
scholars and laypersons alike should be wondering how it is possible to bring a
copyright infringement claim against a song written nearly half a century ago, given
that the statute of limitations for civil copyright claims is only three years. However,
Led Zeppelin re-released Led Zeppelin IV in 2014, and therefore initiated a
completely new statutory period.15
The Supreme Court had had the opportunity to weigh in on the issue in 2014.
In Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the Court addressed this unlimited limitation
in the context of a screenplay written more than two decades prior.16 It held that,
absent extraordinary circumstances, laches cannot be used to bar a claim for
copyright infringement brought within the three-year statutory period.17 This
decision laid the legal foundation for Michael Skidmore’s case, providing him with
the opportunity to pursue a claim nearly half a century old. Furthermore, it
highlighted how judicial interpretation of—and congressional acquiescence to—
issues within the copyright statute of limitations have effectively made the music

9. See generally Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (establishing the principle of
unlawful appropriation of a musical composition).
10. Jordan Runtagh, Songs on Trial: 10 Landmark Music Copyright Cases, ROLLING STONE (June 8,
2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/lists/songs-on-trial-10-landmark-music-copyright-cases-2016
0608/vanilla-ice-vs-queen-and-david-bowie-1990-20160608; see also Bright Tunes Music Corp. v.
Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
11. See Runtagh, supra note 10.
12. Ann Oldenburg, ‘Blurred Lines’ Jury Finds for Marvin Gaye, USA TODAY (Mar. 10, 2015, 5:35
PM), www.usatoday.com/story/life/music/2015/03/10/blurred-lines-trial-verdict/24492431/; see also
Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13–06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 4479500 (C.D. Cal.
July 14, 2015).
13. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV 15–3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 WL 1442461 (C.D. Cal. Apr.
8, 2016).
14. Id. at *1-2.
15. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012); Skidmore, 2016 WL 1442461, at *7.
16. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1970 (2014).
17. Id. at 986.
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copyright limitations period perpetual, with the three-year limit renewing with every
reproduction of the work.
This Note addresses this anomaly—specifically, how it came to be, its current
application, and what can be done about it. In Part II, this Note gives the background
information of the case-in-chief, Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, and briefly identifies its
relevant holdings. Part III provides an outline of substantive copyright law, focusing
on the subject matter of works protected under the law, the scope of those
protections, and the legal basis of musical work infringement claims. Last, in Part
III, this Note looks to Skidmore’s application of this substantive law. Part IV
explores the various limitations on actions for copyright infringement, including the
defenses of: (1) an expired statute of limitations; (2) waiver or abandonment of
rights; and (3) the equitable doctrine of laches. It then looks to Skidmore’s
application of these defenses in relation to Led Zeppelin’s motion for summary
judgment. Part V provides an in depth discussion of Petrella v. Metro-GoldwynMeyer, a 2014 Supreme Court case in which several issues related to limitations on
actions in copyright were addressed. Then, in Part VI, the Supreme Court’s holding
and reasoning from Petrella are applied to and analyzed through the lens of the facts
in Skidmore. In this section, this Note will argue that the court, in applying Petrella,
failed to properly consider and appreciate the circumstances of the case in light of
the Supreme Court’s recognition in Petrella that exceptional circumstances may bar
a copyright infringement action, even when a statute of limitations is present. Part
VII suggests changes to the Copyright Act which, if employed by Congress, would
eliminate the ambiguity in the statute and relieve the federal district courts of the
heavy burden it creates.
II. SKIDMORE V. LED ZEPPELIN
A. Facts
In late 1967, Spirit released their first album with Ode Records, which contained
the instrumental composition “Taurus.”18 A year later, they toured across the United
States in an effort to promote their second album. 19 During the tour in Denver,
Colorado, an up-and-coming British rock band named Led Zeppelin opened for
Spirit.20 Two years after that tour, when Led Zeppelin returned to England during
the holiday season of 1970 into 1971, they recorded “Stairway to Heaven,” which
they first performed later that year in March.21 In November 1971, Led Zeppelin
released “Stairway to Heaven” as the fourth track on the album Led Zeppelin IV.22
In the years that followed, fans loyal to both bands, and even some band
members themselves, could not help but notice the similarity between the opening
sections of each song.23 During a 1991 interview, an interviewer asked Wolfe about
the likelihood that Led Zeppelin had copied “Taurus,” but Wolfe brushed off any
18. Skidmore, 2016 WL 1442461, at *1.
19. Id. at *2.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Under current Copyright Law, Led Zeppelin’s phonorecord release of the song in 1971 would
constitute “publication” of the work, and thus would be the official beginning of when they were
susceptible to infringement suits. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
23. Id. at *3.
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concerns.24 He went so far as to say, “I’ll let [Led Zeppelin] have the beginning of
Taurus for their song without a lawsuit.” 25 Wolfe did approach several lawyers
throughout the years about bringing suit, all of which said the case was too old and
declined to take it.26 Meanwhile, “Stairway to Heaven” was being played time and
time again across radio waves, in record stores, and at the end of countless middle
school dances. True to his word, Wolfe never filed suit before his death in 1997,
when he drowned while saving his son.27 It was not until May 2014 that Michael
Skidmore, acting on behalf of Wolfe’s trust, brought an action against Led
Zeppelin.28 Shortly thereafter, in October 2014, the album Led Zeppelin IV was rereleased.29
B. Arguments
In this action, Skidmore alleged copyright infringement and a violation of the
right of attribution against defendants Led Zeppelin, each individual member of Led
Zeppelin, and a number of record labels.30 In their motion for summary judgment, 31
Led Zeppelin put forward several separate defenses, two of which,
abandonment/waiver of rights and laches, related to the timeliness of the lawsuit. 32

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Led Zeppelin Verdict: Band Didn’t Steal “Stairway to Heaven” Riff, CBS NEWS, http://www.cbs
news.com/news/led-zeppelin-verdict-stairway-to-heaven/ (last updated June 23, 2016).
27. Id.
28. Skidmore, 2016 WL 1442461, at *1.
29. Kory Grow, Led Zeppelin Continue Reissues With 'IV' and 'Houses of the Holy,' ROLLING STONE
(July 29, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/led-zeppelin-continue-reissues-with-iv-andhouses-of-the-holy-20140729.
30. Skidmore, 2016 WL 1442461, at *1.
31. Id. After the court’s ruling on this motion, a trial over the merits of the case was held and a jury
returned a verdict for defendants, saying that defendants had access to the song “Taurus” but that it was
not substantially similar to “Stairway to Heaven.” Matt Diehl, Led Zeppelin 'Stairway' Verdict: Inside the
Courtroom on Trial's Last Day, ROLLING STONE (June 23, 2016), http://www.rollingstone.com/
music/news/led-zeppelin-stairway-verdict-inside-the-courtroom-on-trials-last-day-20160623.
32. Skidmore, 2016 WL 1442461, at *5. Led Zeppelin also called into question whether Wolfe had
retained the rights to the copyright of the song in order to have standing to sue. Id. at *8. Wolfe had
entered into an exclusive songwriter agreement with Hollenbeck Music designating him a “‘writer for
hire’ with ‘full rights of copyright renewal vested in Hollenbeck’” in 1967. Id. at *1. Because of this, Led
Zeppelin argued that Wolfe was not the rightful copyright owner. Id. at *9. Skidmore put forward
evidence that “Taurus” was actually written prior to the agreement, and thus was not created at the
“instance and expense of the engaging party.” Id. at *8 (quoting Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v.
Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 877 (9th Cir. 2005) (referring to the Ninth Circuit’s approach to works
made for hire under the 1909 Copyright Act)). The court held that Skidmore had proffered enough
evidence to survive summary judgment. Id at *9. The work for hire doctrine has since been defined by
Congress, see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012), and clarified by the Supreme Court, see Cmty. for Creative NonViolence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). For the purposes of this Note, we will assume that Wolfe had a
claim to the copyright of the song and thus had standing to sue.
Defendants also argued that plaintiffs failed to produce a deposit copy of the “Taurus” musical
composition from the copyright office. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV 15–3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016
WL 1442461, at *8 (C.D. Cal. April 8, 2016). The court quickly dispersed with this argument, noting that
defendants had presented no authority for this argument and that Ninth Circuit precedent forgave mistake
on copyright registrations. Id.
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They also sought summary judgment on the merits of the case, asserting that
Skidmore could not demonstrate copying. 33
C. Holdings
On the issue of abandonment/waiver, the United States District Court for the
Central District of California found for the plaintiffs.34 The court reasoned that there
was a triable issue of fact as to whether Wolfe, through his statement during his 1991
interview, had acted in a manner with the intent to abandon his rights in the song. 35
The court next addressed whether the lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of laches.
It rejected the defendant’s argument and held that the equitable doctrine of laches
did not bar Skidmore’s claim. 36 Finally, the court considered expert testimony
regarding the similarity of both songs, held that a triable issue of fact existed as to
whether “Stairway to Heaven” bore substantial similarity to legally protectable
elements of “Taurus,” and thus sent the case to be addressed on its merits by a jury. 37
III. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IN MUSIC
Copyright law serves a unique purpose in the American legal system. It is
premised on the idea that the law can protect a person’s imaginative creations. 38
Under the Copyright Act, for a work to be protected it must be: (1) an “original
work[] of authorship”; and (2) “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”39 The
bar for originality is low and requires only a minimal level of creativity. 40 Fixation,
like originality, is relatively easy to establish. For a work to be fixed, its embodiment
in a copy or phonorecord must be “sufficiently permanent or stable” so it can be
communicated for more than a “transitory duration.” 41 Regarding “Taurus,” the
court did not address whether the song was sufficiently original or whether the song
was included on Spirit’s first album. 42 Thus—at least for the purposes of this Note—
we can infer that the song was protectable.
A. Protected Subject Matter in Music Copyrights
The Copyright Act extends its protections to a specific subject matter. 43 Two
types of subject matter apply to recorded music: the protection for musical works, 44
and the protection for sound recordings. 45 Therefore, a song recorded on a
33. Skidmore, 2016 WL 1442461, at *5.
34. Id. at *7.
35. Id. at *6.
36. Id. at *8.
37. Id. at *11.
38. Mark S. Lee, Entertainment and Intellectual Property Law § 1:2 (2016 ed.).
39. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
40. In the seminal opinion by Justice O’Connor, the Supreme Court held that an alphabetical
arrangement of names and phone numbers did not “[possess] at least some minimal degree of creativity,”
thus setting the bar for originality that is followed today. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S.
340, 345 (1991).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
42. Skidmore, 2016 WL 1442461, at *1.
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012).
45. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (2012).
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phonorecord, such as “Taurus,” has two separate and distinct ways in which it is
protected from unlawful copying. These two protections are commonly confused,
and distinguishing them is crucial.
First, a musical work or composition is a song written by a composer consisting
of “rhythm, harmony, and melody.” 46 The musical work protection extends to any
accompanying words that go along with the work.47 Simply put, a musical work is
a “particular sequence and arrangement of lyrics and/or music that comprise what
most people refer to as a ‘song.’” 48 Further, “[a] musical composition's copyright
protects the generic sound that would necessarily result from any performance of the
piece.”49 The drafters of the Copyright Act did not think it necessary to create a
statutory definition of musical work, as the term has a “fairly settled meaning.” 50
In contrast, a “sound recording” operates in conjunction with a musical work; it
is the work’s reproduction onto a phonorecord.51 A sound recording “result[s] from
the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds.” 52 Sound recordings may
be fixed in any tangible medium including phonograph discs, cassettes, and other
objects that allow sound to be communicated either directly or with the aid of a
machine.53 In sum, “[t]he sound recording is the sound produced by the performer’s
rendition of the musical work.”54
The court had dealt with this distinction itself years before Skidmore. In Newton
v. Diamond, the musical piece—a combination of musical work and sound
recording—at issue was a six-second segment of the plaintiff’s song, “Choir.” 55
Defendants, alternative rock and hip-hop group, the Beastie Boys, looped the short
segment repeatedly in their song “Pass the Mic.” 56 The group had obtained a license
to use the sound recording but not the musical work. 57 The Beastie Boys filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing that the musical work rights in the short
sample could not be protected as a matter of law. 58
Recognizing that the license prevented an infringement claim regarding the
sound recording, the Newton court addressed only the musical work protections to
determine whether the Beastie Boys had unlawfully appropriated the underlying
composition of “Choir.”59 It looked first at what elements of Newton’s composition
46. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 272 n.1 (6th Cir. 2009); see also
Lee, supra note 38, at § 7.3.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012).
48. Bridgeport Music, 585 F.3d at 272 n.1.
49. Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (2002).
50. Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 2.05 (2016).
51. Id. at § 2.10.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 101. The Act continues to distinguish sound recordings from those sounds that
accompany audiovisual works, such as motion pictures. Id.
53. Nimmer, supra note 50, at § 2.10.
54. Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1249-50.
55. Id. at 1246.
56. Id.; BEASTIE BOYS, Pass the Mic, on CHECK YOUR HEAD (Capitol Records 1992). You can hear
the sampled portion of the plaintiff’s song clearly at the beginning of the recording, and intermittently
throughout the song.
57. Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1246-47. Newton had sold the rights to the sound recording to ECM
records, who then licensed it to the Beastie Boys. Id. at 1249.
58. Id. at 1247. The Beastie Boys also argued “any misappropriation [was] de minimis, and thus not
actionable as copyright infringement.” Id. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on this
ground. Newton v. Diamond, 349 F.3d 591, 592 (9th Cir. 2003).
59. Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.
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were protected by the musical composition copyright. 60 The techniques Newton
used—playing a note then singing the note above it—had been used a number of
times, by other artists, prior to his recording. 61 Newton argued, however, that his
unique approach to using the technique—which his expert witness termed the
“Newton Technique”—made “Choir” original.62 The court, however, did not accept
this argument. While Newton’s approach in using the technique may have been
original, it appeared nowhere in the musical composition. 63 The modification that
Newton employed was not indicated in the musical score and was merely a result of
his performance.64 The court drew a line between what is written down in the score
as part of the composition and what the artist adds as a result of his or her personal
performance, and determined that it would consider only the former to fall within the
musical work protections.65 The court reasoned that: (1) the portion of the
composition sampled was too small to constitute an infringement; (2) it was not
qualitatively distinctive enough, meaning it was not sufficiently significant to the
song as a whole, to overcome its small size; and (3) Newton’s expert witnesses had
considered performance techniques outside the scope of the composition in their
analyses of the composition’s originality. 66 Thus, the short segment was not
protectable as a matter of law, and the Beastie Boys were successful on their motion
for summary judgment.67
The lesson from Newton is that a musical composition is specific, fixed at the
time it is created, and cannot be altered by anything outside the written notes, even
by the most unique performance technique. Whether it is fixed on paper such as
“Choir,” or on a phonorecord such as “Taurus,” a musical work does not change over
time and is defined at the moment it is written or created. In Skidmore, the suit called
into question whether Led Zeppelin had infringed on the musical work—not sound
recording—in “Taurus.” The song was written in 1967, and thus its musical work
and underlying composition were fixed in that year and could not change over time.
If Led Zeppelin did indeed infringe “Taurus” when it re-released “Stairway to
Heaven” in 2014, that infringement is identical to the infringement that took place in
1967 because the musical composition, as a matter of law, cannot change over time.
B. Substantial Similarity
In order for Skidmore to succeed on the merits, he was required to show the
existence of a substantial similarity between the musical work of each song, which
is typically done by employing circumstantial evidence.68 The plaintiff, after proving
ownership of the copyright, must show that the defendant copied protected elements
of the copyrighted work.69 Because direct evidence of copying is not usually

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 1250 (listing a number of musical works that had previously incorporated the technique).
Id. at 1251
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1252
Id. at 1254-56.
Id. at 1256, 1260.
Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000).
Id.
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available to the plaintiff, the plaintiff must show that the defendant had access to the
copyrighted work and that the two works are substantially similar. 70
“Access requires ‘an opportunity to view or to copy plaintiff’s work.’” 71 This
opportunity must be reasonable and there must be “more than a ‘bare possibility” of
viewing by the defendant.72 Under Ninth Circuit precedent, the inverse-ratio rule
requires that where there is a high degree of access shown, there is a lower standard
of proof of substantial similarity of the works. 73 This proof is shown through a twopart test.74 First, during the extrinsic test, the court usually creates an analytical
dissection of the work by relying on expert testimony.75 During this test, plaintiffs
must identify concrete elements on which to base their claim.76
The second part of the substantial similarity test is the intrinsic test, under which
a jury must determine “whether the ordinary, reasonable person would find the total
concept and feel of the works to be substantially similar.”77 This analysis relies on
fact-based showings to a jury, whose verdict is given deferential treatment so long
as it is based on sufficient evidence.78
On the issue of access, evidence clearly established on the record included:
(1) Spirit and Led Zeppelin’s performances at the same venue at least three times
between the Denver show in 1968 and the release of Led Zeppelin IV in 1971; (2) the
interactions between the groups at the festivals; and (3) the admissions from
members of Led Zeppelin that they were fans of Spirit.79 Led Zeppelin argued that
no reasonable juror could find access based on this chain of events. 80 Led Zeppelin
also offered into evidence additional facts mitigating the amount of interaction both
parties had during these performances.81 The court held there was sufficient
circumstantial evidence regarding Led Zeppelin’s access to “Taurus,” and therefore
a factual dispute existed that needed to be addressed.82
Moving on to the extrinsic test, the Skidmore court first noted the protected
element in question was the descending chromatic bass line during the first two
minutes of the song, lasting thirteen seconds.83 Skidmore’s experts testified that the
two songs shared several similarities during that portion of the song, and that the
beginning section is arguably the most qualitatively important segment of the song. 84
Defendant’s experts countered that the descending chromatic bass line was a
70. Id.
71. Id. at 482 (quoting Sid and Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 1977)).
72. Id. (quoting Jason v. Fonda, 698 F.2d 966, 967 (9th Cir. 1982)).
73. Id. at 485.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Pasillas v. McDonald’s Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 2011)).
78. Id. at 481-82.
79. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV 15-3462 RGK (AgRx), 2016 WL 1442461, at *2, 12 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 8, 2016).
80. Id. at *13.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *11.
83. Id. at *16.
84. Id. (citing Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Even if a copied portion be
relatively small in proportion to the entire work, if qualitatively important, the finder of fact may properly
find a substantial similarity.”)).
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“common convention that abounds the music industry,” and thus was not a
protectable element of the song.85 The court noted the “similarities here transcend
the core structure,” taking into account the notoriety of the segment as well as the
fact that both bass lines were played at the same pitch. 86 It held that Skidmore had
identified sufficient concrete protectable elements for the case to proceed.87
In all musical work infringement cases, the court does not second-guess the
jury’s finding during the intrinsic test, and reverses factual findings of access during
the extrinsic test if they involved a clearly erroneous application of the law. 88 Thus,
a jury is given a significant responsibility in determining whether two works are
substantially similar. The district court hearing the case must therefore exercise due
diligence in eliminating frivolous claims, properly weighing the evidence given
during depositions, eliminating unprotectable elements of the content in question,
and otherwise narrowing the scope of the jury’s consideration as much as possible.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON ACTIONS FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
While the case was brought forty-three years after the first cause of action
accrued, the re-release of Led Zeppelin IV triggered the beginning of a new statutory
period, allowing the case to proceed.89 As with any area of law, defendants in
copyright infringement cases are allowed to present a number of defenses in the pretrial phase to have the complaint either dismissed during pleadings or after a
successful motion for summary judgment; in this case, Led Zeppelin filed a motion
for summary judgment on several grounds. 90 We look first at the statute of
limitations in copyright law and how courts have applied and interpreted it since its
codification. We then look specifically at two of the defenses offered by Led
Zeppelin in Skidmore, abandonment and laches, then relate them back to the statute
of limitations.
A. Statute of Limitations
Copyright law is unique in the way that it tracks the period for a statutory
limitation on actions for untimeliness. “When a defendant commits successive
violations, the statute of limitations runs separately from each violation. Each time
an infringing work is reproduced or distributed, the infringer commits a new
wrong.”91 In 1957, Congress adopted an express three-year statute of limitations for
copyright infringement claims.92 While Congress may have placed a firm limit on
bringing suit, it neglected to take into account the nature and type of property
protected under copyright law. Courts and scholars have had to pick up the slack by
recognizing that a separate-accrual rule governs the copyright statute of limitations.93
Each time a work is reproduced–for example, a re-release of a record–or distributed,
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Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1969 (2014).
See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012).
Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1969.
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the infringer is liable to suit.94 Therefore, courts are required to address two
questions arising under these circumstances: (1) when does the statute of limitations
begin to accrue; and (2) how far back do you look to measure damages?
1. Moment of Accrual
Courts have been forced to determine when the clock on the statute of limitations
for copyright infringement begins to tick. In doing so, they have developed two
different approaches. First, the injury rule holds that the accrual period begins when
the infringement first occurs. This theory was discussed in detail in Auscape
International v. National Geographic Society.95 Looking to legislative history, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York found that
Congress had the goal of creating a fixed statute of limitations.96 The court reasoned
infringement is generally done through public display or performance, and thus a
person can easily ascertain any infringement of his or her rights. 97 Therefore, it
adopted the injury rule because it is more fixed, in line with Congress’s intentions,
and is better suited for infringement cases where the injury would be immediately
known.98
The second approach, which has much wider acceptance among the circuits, 99
is the discovery rule. Under that rule, the statute of limitations does not begin to
accrue until the copyright holder learns, or reasonably should have learned, of the
infringement.100 This theory, contrary to the injury rule, considers the circumstances
of the plaintiff—i.e., whether they knew or should have known about the
infringement—in determining the start of the clock to file suit. The discovery rule
tends to be applied when a statute is silent on the issue. 101 It is the method applied
by the Ninth Circuit in copyright cases. 102
2. How to Measure Three Years
When awarding damages, courts have struggled in determining how far back
they should look when assessing them, and have developed two possible approaches
to the question. The first, the continuing wrong theory, was created by Judge Posner
in Taylor v. Meirick.103 Under this theory, when there has been a series of
infringements lasting for more than the initial statutory period, as long as the most
recent one occurred within three years and the plaintiff was reasonably ignorant to
the previous infringements, the plaintiff can bring suit and collect damages for all
infringements.104 In Taylor, while the infringing acts took place over the course of

94. Id.
95. 409 F. Supp. 2d. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
96. Id. at 245 (asserting that the legislative history makes it clear that injury rule is in line with the
certainty Congress intended when drafting the Copyright Act).
97. Id. at 247.
98. Id.
99. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1969 n.4.
100. Id.
101. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 27 (2001).
102. See Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex, 384 F.3d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 2004).
103. 712 F.2d 1112, 1118 (1983).
104. Nimmer, supra note 50, at § 12.05.
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several years, because Taylor filed suit within three years of the last act, he was able
to collect damages for all of the previous infringements.
The second and more widely held theory is the rolling theory.105 Under that
theory, the court cuts off any damages that occurred more than three years before the
cause of action was filed.106 For example, if the series of infringements began on
May 1, 2000, and the plaintiff waited until June 30, 2010 to file suit, the plaintiff
could only recover for profits and damages attributable to infringement since June
30, 2007. This is now the accepted measuring stick to use as the Supreme Court
officially adopted this approach in Petrella.107
B. Waiver/Abandonment
Abandonment of a copyright occurs only if there is intent shown by the
copyright holder to abandon the work: manifestation of which is shown through an
overt act.108 This is not a heavily litigated subject area, but the Skidmore court cited
two analogous cases which addressed the issue, and adopted its reasoning to form its
holding on abandonment. Here we take a closer look at those cases.
In Melchizedek v. Holt, the plaintiff copyright holder stated on several occasions
that he did not care about copyrights and that there are more important things than
copyright protection.109 Of these statements, the Skidmore court cited a remark the
copyright creator made while at a conference in Germany: “I don’t care about
copyrights or any of that stuff, that doesn’t matter. Forget it, just take it and you’ll
understand what this is all about by tomorrow.” 110 The court in Melchizedek held
that the plaintiff’s statements did not amount to an intent to abandon rights because
it was unclear which copyrights he was talking about. 111
The second analogous case referred to in Skidmore involved the “Happy
Birthday” song. In Marya v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., the plaintiffs filed a class
action suit for declaratory judgment that the copyright of the song, owned by the
defendant, was invalid.112 As in Skidmore, the plaintiffs offered evidence from a
magazine article showing that the defendant had acquiesced to the use of the lyrics
by the public, resigning herself to the fact that the lyrics had become common
property.113 The court stated, “[w]e cannot say that this evidence is sufficient to
entitle Plaintiffs to a directed verdict at trial inasmuch as it is not a direct quote from
[the lyricist].”114
From these two cases we may surmise that, at least for the Skidmore court’s
analysis, abandonment of a copyright is an affirmative defense in which the
defendant must prove that: (1) the copyright holder in their statements was
referencing the specific work in question; and (2) there was a direct quote expressing
the holder’s intent to abandon their rights to the work.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1970 (2014).
108. Nimmer, supra note 50, at § 13.06.
109. 792 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1048 (D. Ariz. 2011).
110. Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV 15-3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 WL 1442461, at *5 (C.D. Cal.
April 8, 2016) (quoting Melchizedek, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1048).
111. Melchizedek, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.
112. 131 F. Supp. 3d 975, 979 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
113. Id. at 992-93.
114. Id. at 993.
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Abandonment of rights was the first defense that Led Zeppelin asserted. The
band argued that Wolfe’s statement during the 1991 interview, in which he seemed
to brush off any concern about them infringing “Taurus,” was a clear manifestation
of intent to abandon and an affirmative act of abandonment. 115 Led Zeppelin even
garnered testimony from the person who conducted the interview. 116 Skidmore
countered with evidence showing Wolfe never reviewed the article before it was
published, the tone of the interview was one of “trying to save face and make light
of a bad situation” rather than communicating a serious intent to abandon his rights,
he had subsequently acted in a manner inconsistent with such an intent, and he had
been in talks with different attorneys throughout the years about filing an
infringement action.117 The court found, comparing these facts to the cases discussed
above, that the evidence offered conflicting issues of fact that a jury would need to
sort out.118 In deciding the summary judgment motion before it, the Skidmore court
gave greater weight to circumstantial evidence regarding the tenor of the interview
and Wolfe’s state of mind during it than to the direct quote from Wolfe in which he
expressly referenced both songs in question.
C. Development of the Equitable Doctrine of Laches
The doctrine of laches is an affirmative defense by which a plaintiff can be
barred from relief, equitably, if the defendant can show the circumstances of the case
warrant it.119 The application of the doctrine in copyright law was summarized in
Judge Learned Hand’s 1916 decision in Haas v. Feist, Inc.120 In that case, the court
addressed the similarity of two songs.121 After receiving initial notice of the
infringement, the plaintiff delayed bringing suit for several months. 122 Judge Hand
reasoned:
[I]t is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full notice of an
intended infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed infringer spends
large sums of money in its exploitation, and to intervene only when his
exploitation has proved a success. Delay under such circumstances allows
the owner to speculate without risk with the other’s money; he cannot
possibly lose, and he may win.123
The plaintiff in Hass was allowed to recover damages only to the extent they
accumulated before he received notice of the infringement, so as to avoid
capitalization of the defendant’s cost in exploiting the work.124
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the issue in 1947 in Universal Pictures Co. v.
Harold Lloyd Corp.125 The appellant, Universal, invoked the doctrine of laches in
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an attempt to preclude Lloyd’s recovery of damages. 126 Universal argued that, after
notice of the infringement, Lloyd had unreasonably delayed for fifteen months
before asserting a claim for infringement.127 The court opined that the general rule
from Haas was “reasonable,” but noted that Judge Hand had also discussed that,
where the defendant had deliberately copied a work, laches may be irrelevant. 128
Here, there was widespread dissemination of the infringing work, and the length of
copied material was a significant portion of the original work, thus reducing the value
of the original.129
Upon the adoption of the express three-year limitation in 1957, a circuit split
developed over whether laches still had a role in copyright infringement. The
Eastern District of New York and the Fourth Circuit both held that copyright law,
since the adoption of a statute of limitations, no longer recognized the equitable
defense.130 The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, upheld its past precedent applying
the doctrine when it addressed the issue in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn Meyer: in
applying the laches doctrine, the court held that, because the plaintiff had
intentionally delayed bringing suit until the copyrighted work proved profitable, that
plaintiff was precluded from bringing suit. 131
V. “RAGING BULL”: THE SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN
In 2014, the problems involving the statute of limitations in copyright
infringement and the applicability of laches came to a head. The Supreme Court
chose to address the issue when it heard Petrella on appeal from the Ninth Circuit.
This case provided the backbone for the Skidmore court’s holding.
A. Background
In 1976, Frank Petrella and Jake “The Bronx Bull” LeMotta sold a screenplay
they had written about LeMotta’s time as a boxing champion of the 1940s and
1950s.132 Four years later, a subsidiary of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”) created
and released the film “Raging Bull” after acquiring the rights to the screenplay in
1978.133 In 1991, Petrella’s daughter, Paula, renewed the copyright in the original
screenplay and eventually became the sole owner of the copyright.134 In 2009, after
several years of back and forth between Paula Petrella and MGM regarding her rights
to the work, Petrella filed a copyright infringement claim in the familiar United
States District Court for the Central District of California.135
MGM moved for summary judgment, arguing that Petrella, by waiting eighteen
years to file her complaint—the time since she had acquired the rights in 1991—had
126. Id. at 372.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 369.
130. Nimmer, supra note 50, at § 12.06.
131. 695 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2012).
132. Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1970 (2014); see also Jake LaMotta
Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/people/jake-lamotta-259489#professionalboxing-success (last updated Nov. 28, 2016).
133. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1970.
134. Id. at 1971.
135. Id.
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unreasonably delayed the suit and prejudiced MGM’s case. 136 The district court held,
and the court of appeals afiirmed, that the equitable doctrine of laches barred any
relief for Petrella.137 The Ninth Circuit noted in its decision that it suspected the true
cause of Petrella’s delay was the fact that, although the film had not made any money
in years, MGM had made a substantial investment in exploiting “Raging Bull,”
believing they were the sole owners of the copyright to the screenplay. 138
B. Holding and Reasoning
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that: (1) laches could not be evoked to bar
adjudication of a claim brought within the three-year statutory period; (2) in
extraordinary circumstances, the threshold of relief may be equitably barred by
laches; and (3) a plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit can impact a court’s assessment of
damages.139
The Court noted that the principle application of laches was to claims for which
Congress “provided no fixed time limitation.” 140 The doctrine originated in courts
of equity where no express limit existed, 141 and the Supreme Court has routinely
cautioned against invoking it as a bar to legal relief.142 The purpose of Congress
enacting the statute of limitations was, in part, to create uniformity regarding the time
in which copyright claims could be pursued.143 Looking for consistency in copyright
suits, the Court held that “in face of a statute of limitations enacted by Congress,
laches cannot be invoked to bar legal relief.”144
Adopting the rolling theory of relief, the majority continued and reasoned that
because the copyright act itself takes into account delays in bringing action, a
plaintiff can “gain retrospective relief only three years back from the time of the
suit,”145 thus, an “infringer is insulated from liability for earlier infringements of the
same work.”146 The Court noted that a defendant still may try to reduce actual
damages by offsetting profits made during that period with “deductible expenses”
incurred, while generating profits and “elements of profit attributable to factors other
than the copyrighted work.”147
On the issue of accrual, the Court did not expressly adopt either the injury rule
or the discovery rule. It stated in dicta that the limitations period generally begins
when the plaintiff has a “present cause of action,” and “can file suit[,] and obtain
relief.”148 This would indicate an adoption of the injury rule, as evidenced by
beginning the clock at the time of infringement without regard to whether the
plaintiff knew or should have known that their work was being used. However, the
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Court recognized the existence of the discovery rule and its use by a majority of the
circuits, and noted that it had “not passed on the question.”149
Most importantly, the Court did not completely prohibit applying laches in the
copyright context. A statute of limitations does not completely bar claims for
equitable relief, even though courts are generally cautioned against this.150 The Court
provided one example: “when a copyright owner engages in intentionally misleading
representations concerning his abstention from suit, and the alleged infringer
detrimentally relies on the copyright owner’s deception, the doctrine of estoppel may
bar the copyright owner’s claims completely.”151 Instead of a bright-line rule barring
the laches defense when a statute of limitations is present, the Court reserved the
doctrine’s application where the facts and circumstances of the case allow. Thus, in
extraordinary circumstances, a court may bar a plaintiff’s entitlement to relief in the
interest of equity.
C. Dissent
Petrella was decided over a dissent written by Justice Breyer, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, which took into account the practical
considerations of modern litigation.152 That dissent refutes the Court’s analysis in
several ways.
First, the three-year look back limit on damages still allows plaintiffs to wait
until net revenues from the infringement turned positive and, therefore, gain from
collecting damages when the infringing work was most profitable. 153
Second, a plaintiff can also delay suit until the defendant has recovered the
majority of their expenses attributable to factors other than infringement, which the
plaintiff would not be entitled to collect,154 thus taking advantage of defendant’s
profits without being required to subtract expenses.155
Third, legislative history, the practice of federal courts, and several decisions by
the Supreme Court present no indication that Congress intended to bar the
application of equitable relief—or equity to bar legal relief—by the enactment of an
express statute of limitations.156
The first two bullets of reasoning are the result of the rolling statute of
limitations. Justice Breyer cautioned that this rolling application allows claims to
remain dormant until they prove profitable to the plaintiff. 157 For example, effective
lawyering would advise a plaintiff to wait until the last day of a profitable statutory
period to file his claim—especially when that period is several years after the initial
infringing act occurred—when it is likely that the defendant has exhausted all of his
own expenditures in exploiting the work and thus all monies received are pure

149. Id. at 1969 n.4. At least one court has addressed this ambiguity in detail. See Design Basics LLC
v. J&V Roberts Invs., 130 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1282 (E.D. Wis. 2015) (holding that “until the Seventh
Circuit holds otherwise,” it would continue to apply the discovery rule).
150. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1973.
151. Id. at 1977.
152. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1985 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1981.
154. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2012).
155. Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1981-82 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 1982.
157. See id. at 1980.
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profit.158 Indeed, the dissent takes note of this anomaly: “If a defendant reproduces
or sells an infringing work on a continuing basis, a plaintiff can sue every 3 years
until the copyright term expires—which may be up to 70 years after the author’s
death.”159
Because the majority of the Petrella Court did not heed Justice Breyer’s
warning, the Skidmore court was not required to address the statute of limitations. 160
However, the Supreme Court did leave open the extraordinary circumstances
exception if the Skidmore court saw fit to use it. Looking for the application of laches
in the case-in-chief, Led Zeppelin argued the case should not proceed because
Skidmore was working in an equitable relationship for Wolfe, and Petrella expressly
reserved laches as a defense for equitable relief. 161 Dismissing this argument as
legally baseless and founded only on semantics, the Skidmore court held that the suit
could move forward, given that it had been filed within the three-year statute of
limitations—looking back to the re-release of the album in 2014—and finding no
extraordinary circumstances.162
VI. ANALYSIS
Just twelve days after the Supreme Court released its Petrella decision, Michael
Skidmore brought his suit, arguing that a song written forty-three years earlier—
which just happened to be one of the most commercially successful rock songs in
history—bore a substantial similarity to a song a trustee he represented had written
forty-five years before the complaint was filed, and thus unlawfully appropriated his
rights. On its motion for summary judgment, Led Zeppelin put forth several
arguments that were struck down one by one. With each ruling for the plaintiff, the
court dug in deeper and deeper, failing to realize the burden it was putting on itself,
the litigants, and the twelve people who would be asked to sort the whole mess out.
The case-in-chief presented a situation where extraordinary circumstances
existed, and the court could and should have invoked the exception reserved in
Petrella to bar Skidmore’s claim. First, with a direct quote from him and an express
identification of the works in question, the court had the opportunity to dismiss the
claim at summary judgment on the grounds that Wolfe had abandoned his rights to
the work. Even if the court was reluctant to make a dispositive ruling on that basis,
the evidence Skidmore presented refuting the conclusiveness of the interview was a
subjective interpretation of Wolfe’s state of mind twenty-three years ago. And while
Skidmore may have put forth several witnesses to speak to Wolfe’s state of mind at
that time, the only reliable person to speak on a matter so subjective had been dead
for several years. The feat required to evaluate and determine these subjective facts
should have had an impact on the court’s consideration of whether extraordinary
circumstances were present.
When considering whether a substantial similarity existed between the songs,
the court failed to appreciate the daunting task the jury would have in addressing this
issue. On the issue of access, the jury would be required to decide how closely the
158.
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members of Spirit and Led Zeppelin had associated with one another while they
toured together. The jury would then have to decide whether, during that association,
there was more than a bare possibility that Led Zeppelin became so familiar with
“Taurus” that it could copy its introduction. In order to decide this point, the jury
would need to determine roughly how often Spirit played the song, and whether that
amount satisfied the threshold requirement of access. 163 Skidmore’s case was
supported only by testimony from Wolfe’s family that “Taurus” was Wolfe’s
favorite song.164 Because such evidence is circumstantial, the jury would need to
consider the character of each witness in deciding these questions. 165 The witnesses
in turn would be recalling events that occurred nearly half a century ago—twice as
long ago as those concerning abandonment. This is another significant factor that
the Skidmore court should have included when it considered the question of whether
extraordinary circumstances existed to the extent that justifies a granting of summary
judgment.
Deciding that the issues of abandonment of rights and access to the plaintiff’s
work should be left to the jury, the court next considered whether laches could be
applied in this case. Given the underlying holding in Petrella, and its exception for
extraordinary circumstances, the Skidmore court stated, “[w]hile the [Supreme]
Court held that laches was unavailable as a defense to a copyright action seeking
damages, it preserved the role of laches in copyright actions seeking equitable
relief.”166 It continued, “the Petrella [C]ourt used the term ‘equitable’ as a concept
of relief to be contrasted with legal or monetary remedy.” 167 Because Skidmore, like
most plaintiffs, was seeking legal or monetary relief, the court rejected the
application of laches.168
This is a mischaracterization and misunderstanding of the Supreme Court’s
holding and reasoning in Petrella. The term “equitable” relates not to the type of
relief sought but to the nature of the doctrine of laches. The Supreme Court gave no
indication that it intended laches to apply to equitable relief as distinct from a legal
or monetary relief. In fact, in circumstances where the plaintiff is the party that
benefits form the application of the doctrine, such as in a situation involving the
purposeful concealment of the infringing work by the defendant, that plaintiff is still
able to seek monetary and legal relief. The Supreme Court reserved the doctrine to
apply, under general equitable principles, where circumstances unfairly prejudice a
party’s case.
Finally, this case highlights a major flaw in applying the Petrella decision to
Skidmore and other similar music plagiarism cases. Even though a plaintiff bears
the burden of proving its case if it wins the battle over laches, the task of proving a
substantial similarity between two pieces of music in a musical work copyright
infringement case is not compounded by aging evidence in the way that the
defendant’s job of proving their defenses is. In Skidmore, whether the defendants

163. Id. at *12.
164. Id. at *14.
165. See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 482 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The credibility of
witnesses is an issue for the jury and is generally not subject to appellate review.”).
166. Skidmore, 2016 WL 1442461, at *7. This may have been a result of Led Zeppelin’s argument
regarding the issue of equitable relief.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *8.
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had access was an issue of fact.169 If access could be shown, the verdict would come
down to whether the two songs share a substantial similarity based on the total
concept and feel of the works.170 Because a musical work is fixed at the time it is
written—unlike the memory of a witness—the substantial similarity determination
has not been detrimentally affected due to the lapse of time. The only evidence
affected by delay is evidence critical to a defendant’s case, thus defendants are
unfairly prejudiced by the passage of time. The Supreme Court employed the
extraordinary circumstances situation to avoid this very scenario.
VII. CONGRESSIONAL REPAIRS
While it would behoove federal district courts to, within reason, employ the
extraordinary circumstances exception when faced with a situation similar to
Skidmore, Congress has the ability to save them the trouble. The underlying problem
from which all of these issues stem is the perpetual statute of limitations in copyright
law, which effectively runs equal in time to the life of the copyright through the
continuing reproduction of an infringing work. This was the underlying problem
outlined in Justice Breyer’s Petrella dissent.171
Congress should eliminate the ambiguity regarding when the clock on the statute
of limitations begins ticking. The discovery rule, or allowing courts when employing
the injury rule to consider extraordinary circumstances and equity, would contribute
to the overall fairness of proceedings and take into account a plaintiff’s justifiable
reasons for delay. This would also alleviate situations where a plaintiff like
Skidmore, or the hypothetical plaintiff in the Petrella dissent, is able to delay
commencing suit for years while leading a defendant to rely on his inaction and
exploit the infringing work, only to have the plaintiff file suit once exploitation has
turned profitable.172 Furthermore, this practice would be in line with the warning
given by Judge Hand when he established the doctrine’s application in copyright law
and therefore provide at least some of the uniformity initially sought by Congress. 173
This issue of plaintiffs taking advantage of defendants by delaying the
commencement of a suit could also be dealt with in another way. Congress should
eliminate the rolling statute of limitations and stipulate that once a plaintiff knows or
should have known about the infringement, a strict three-year time limit starts, and
that time limit is not renewed with every act of infringement. This would work well
in regard to the nature of a musical work, as it is stuck in the time in which it was
created. For Skidmore, this would mean that once Led Zeppelin released “Stairway
to Heaven,” Wolfe had three years to decide whether he wanted to file suit for
copyright infringement. This would alleviate concerns of evidential prejudice the
defendant may experience with the passage of time. It would also increase the
likelihood that established on the record would be testimony from the actual
copyright holder who has the greatest ability to shed light on the several issues a jury
must consider—especially those involving his or her own state of mind.
Furthermore, this practice would create a less ambiguous statute for courts to
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interpret, which would satisfy the uniform statutory period Congress had in mind in
1957.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In a situation where: (1) the plaintiff knew of the infringing work forty-three
years before he brought the claim; (2) the evidence needed to refute the claim, but
not prove it, had disappeared throughout those forty-three years; and (3) the plaintiff
had made a statement in which he made more than an implication that he was not
going to pursue any claim against the defendant, any onlooker would think, in the
interest of fairness, this case is dead on arrival. However, because of impractical
interpretation of a statute by federal courts, and acquiescence in, or reluctance to,
addressing the underlying problems, a jury was summoned to hear the merits of this
case.
Congress looks for consistency with every statute it writes. However,
considering every possible fact pattern when drafting a law is impossible, so
Congress relies on courts to fill the gaps. While filing these gaps, courts must
appreciate the challenge of considering all possible fact patterns and anticipate that,
even when it appears the law favors only one party, the extraordinary circumstances
of the case may merit holding for the other side in the interest of fairness and equity.
This task was carried out by the Supreme Court in Petrella. There, even with a strict
interpretation of the statute of limitations, the Court reserved a fail-safe for district
courts—the extraordinary circumstances exception in applying the equitable doctrine
of laches. In Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, when faced with the same daunting task, the
court failed to appreciate this idea and the challenges Congress is faced with. It
failed to adhere to the underlying principle from Petrella: to be consistent, courts
must strictly adhere to the limits imposed by Congress. However, in the most
extraordinary of circumstances, fairness and equity should win the day.
These circumstances were ignored, and a case that should have been dismissed
was sent to a jury to perform an impossible and unreasonable task. However,
because of this, we are able to shed light on the underlying issues of this oversight
and place a Band-Aid on the problem. Congress can look at the facts of Skidmore
and appreciate the need to end the perpetual statute of limitations that has engulfed
copyright law. Failure to do so would lead to an onslaught of overlooked
extraordinary circumstances and more re-releases of classic albums that are hindered
by a possible lawsuit over a song written a generation ago.

